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Abstract. Natural hazards threaten the urban system and its
components that are likely to fail. With their high degree of
interdependency, urban networks and services are critical is-
sues for the resilience of a city. And yet, network managers
are scarcely aware of their ﬂaws and dependencies and they
are reluctant to take them into account. In order to develop an
operational tool to improve urban resilience, we propose here
an auto-diagnosis method to be completed by network man-
agers. The subsequent confrontation of all diagnoses is the
basis of collaborative research for problem identiﬁcation and
solution design. The tool is experimented with the Parisian
urban transport society.
1 Introduction
In the race for an operational approach of the resilience con-
cept, some researchers have focused on assessments, indica-
tors and dashboards. But the confusion in the comprehen-
sion of this vague concept, its multiple origins and multi-
ple application ﬁelds are questioning the effectiveness of this
search for implementation (Brand and Jax, 2007). This re-
search focuses on urban resilience to natural hazards. We use
here the resilience concept in a previous work: “The ability
of a city to absorb a disturbance and recover its functions
after the disturbance” (Lhomme et al., 2011). This deﬁni-
tion implies that the urban system is able to reduce globally
the effects of a perturbation and that its functions (decision-
making, economic development, cultural development, life
support, etc.) can be maintained or restored rapidly follow-
ing a disturbance. Now, urban functions depends on urban
services (water supply, telecommunications, transportation,
energy), so their continuity of service is essential. Also, a
resilient city needs reliable services that rely on a resilient
network.
Natural hazards are highly susceptible to disturbing urban
systems and to threatening human lives, goods and activi-
ties (Godschalk, 2003). In addition to the damages on build-
ings and infrastructures, networks are intensively impacted
by natural hazards (see, for instance, the multiple reports
written after hurricane Katrina). Their geographical exten-
sion and their high complexity expose them to disruption fol-
lowing an event, being directly (pipe disruption) or indirectly
(employee absence). And yet, technical networks are needed
during the emergency phase and afterwards, to foster a quick
recovery and a better reconstruction (Tierney and Bruneau,
2007). Besides, the increase in technology and the inter-
nationalization of resources created many interdependencies
between networks (Rinaldi et al., 2001). The fact that techni-
cal networks are dependent on each other is well-known, but
scarcely taken into account in disaster risk reduction. The
major parts of research concerning critical infrastructure in-
terdependencies have focused on modeling and multi-agent
simulation (Kr¨ oger, 2008) in order to understand the interac-
tions between systems. On the contrary, our approach relies
on managerial expertise in order to highlight their knowledge
of their complex system, build a speciﬁc portrait of the
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Fig. 1. City system as an input-output model (source: Lhomme S.).
system and ensure the managers’ acceptance and awareness
of infrastructure interdependencies.
Thus, the issue is to have network managers collaborate
in order to tackle these interdependencies and implement
common solutions improving urban resilience (Toubin et al.,
2011). Indeed, resilience needs an integrated approach able
to overcome the usual segmentation that hampers knowledge
and resource sharing or collaborative implementation of mit-
igation measures (Boin et al., 2010). Prior to the event, net-
work managers need to know on which networks they rely
on and to what extent they are dependent on them to oper-
ate their service. This knowledge should then be used during
the crisis management to prioritize repair interventions or to
plan additional resources allocations. It is also valuable in-
formation to design more resilient systems or to adapt tech-
nical networks so that they can withstand disturbances. In
this paper, we use equally the term technical network or sys-
tem, because we chose a systemic approach to assess urban
resilience, so that technical networks are sub-systems of the
urban system.
The following part describes the tool developed to high-
light those interdependencies and explains how it is used to
raise awareness of urban resilience to natural hazards in gen-
eral. The third part gives an example of application with
the Paris transport service (RATP) and its issues facing ﬂood
hazards. Then, the method is discussed in part four.
We present here the ﬁrst results of a research began in
late 2010, so some notions are still in construction and the
method will be improved with several case studies.
2 Methodology and tool
The methodology developed here is designed to challenge
hurdles identiﬁed in the existing tools to improve urban re-
silience. The essential issue is interdependencies identiﬁca-
tion and management. Then, the tool should enable network
managers to identify the networks they are dependent on: it
is a diagnosis. Each manager describes his/her system with
a chart, indicating which resources (s)he needs and which
resources (s)he provides (Fig. 1). We are addressing here
“input” interdependencies between systems (Eusgeld et al.,
2011). For the water supply, for instance, water is needed
from a source (river, water table), electricity is needed to run
pumps and telecommunications are needed to remotely man-
age pumps and gates. The resource provided by the system
is drinkable water.
Resources are separated into two categories: internal or
external. Internal resources are the ones coming from the
system that are available inside the boundary of the system
and on which the manager should have more control. For
instance, employees and ﬁnancial resources are considered
intrinsic to the system, whereas electricity or other materials
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Fig. 2. Auto-diagnosis to be completed by the network manager.
are external. Additional information can be added, such as
quantiﬁcation and location of the needs, but it is not neces-
sary to the ﬁrst approach. Indeed, managers are often reluc-
tant to share information about their network. The precise
needs, the location and the subsequent infrastructure are crit-
ical information for safety and strategic reasons (Robert et
al., 2009), but also for the competition between operators or
their notoriety, or simply because the exact location is not
known. Those issues imply that the diagnosis should not be
too accurate, and that the managers ﬁll it in themselves: it is
an auto-diagnosis.
In order to have relevant information concerning interde-
pendencies, managers are asked to assess the criticality of
their needs for the functioning of their system. With the
consequent hierarchy between the entering resources, they
should better understand why they have to take them into
account, collaborate with the provider and ﬁnd solutions to
ensure their reliability (Fig. 2).
Severalpiecesofinformationarerequired, priortothecrit-
icality evaluation, in order to help the manager. For instance,
whether the system has an alternative source to compensate
a resource, providing it with additional autonomy (e.g. an
electric generator in order to compensate a power cut). Other
information concerning the impact of a possible shortage on
the system also helps the manager in characterizing his/her
dependency towards a resource. Thus, it is asked how long
the system would keep on functioning in case of a shortage
of a resource; then, when the entering resource is available
again, how long it would take for the system to recover its
functions. It is a rough evaluation: from a few hours to sev-
eral weeks, but this temporal information is relevant to assess
the margins of the maneuver of the system. It enables the as-
sessment of cascading failures between systems (Fig. 3) and
when the systems are recovering, the lag between systems
that can delay the ﬁnal supply of a service.
Concerning the resource provided by the system to other
systems, the managers are also asked which users they have
identiﬁed and how critical they think their resource is for the
user. This second evaluation is added in order to compare
the perception of the provider and the user towards the same
resource and to highlight offsets.
Once those diagnoses are realized for each system, the in-
terest is to gather the managers and to have them discuss on
the basis of the diagnoses. A common representation of in-
terdependencies can be displayed to summarize the results
and identify critical links (Fig. 4). Differences in perception
are emphasized by the difference in arrow width, so that the
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Fig. 3. Cascading failures between 3 systems.
following managers can discuss the criticality, and agree on
the importance of the dependency.
3 Case study
The method was ﬁrst applied to the Parisian transportation
society (RATP), which manages the metros, buses and sub-
urban transports (RER). Several metro lines were already in
service in 1910 when the Seine ﬂooded many districts of
Paris and neighboring cities. These ﬂoods now serve as the
reference for ﬂood risk management in Paris. The RATP al-
ready experienced the event: in 1910, 50% of the metro net-
work was ﬂooded, but the system recovered in 4 months. The
RATP planned for the crisis and now beneﬁts from informa-
tion on how the network behaved during the ﬂoods. This
reference will be used in this case study for reducing the vul-
nerability of the present network. The transportation network
(especially the metros) is very old and highly vulnerable in
case of ﬂoods. In order to preserve the infrastructure and
the trains, which would be irreplaceable, the RATP plans to
protect the network. For each level of the river, they know
which points are likely to be ﬂooded. As a protective mea-
sure, they have planned to build walls around the station en-
trances (among others) in order to prevent the water from
entering the underground.
According to the RATP manager we met, they will focus
hereonthemetrosysteminthesituationofmoderatedﬂoods,
i.e. where the network is not entirely ﬂooded. In fact, 30% of
the service should not be ensured because of the closed sta-
tions, mainly in the center part of Paris, near the Seine. Be-
cause of conﬁdentiality matters, the auto-diagnosis is limited
to the external resources and no information on quantities or
location were given. The information collected allows iden-
tifying external dependencies, which is the main challenge of
our research.
For each resource, the manager identiﬁes why it is needed,
what autonomy the system has, the alternatives solutions that
can be set up and then the criticality of the resource. For in-
stance, they spontaneously added the resources needed for
train maintenance. They come from several suppliers and
the RATP has a stock of spare parts (enabling a few weeks
of autonomy), but it is necessary for the functioning of the
system. The manager also identiﬁed several resources that
are necessary for the employees to be able to work: trans-
portation and roads to come to work, food and water supply,
and sewage disposal. Degraded conditions of these resources
could probably be accepted for a few days in case of crisis,
but the impacts of a longer disruption should be assessed.
All in all, the portrait of the RATP system, as constructed
with the manager, is given in Fig. 5.
This graphical representation highlights the strong depen-
dency on electricity and the high vulnerability of the system
to a possible disruption. As the manager notiﬁed, the RATP
already knows this critical dependency and it has set up a
complete strategy to reduce its speciﬁc vulnerability. It re-
lies on an expected vicious circle, where electricity powers
pumps that evacuate waters from the underground in order to
protect the electrical infrastructures that supply pumps! We
identiﬁed another interesting result of this analysis: an in-
terdependency created by the system and symbolized by the
dotted loop. Indeed, in order to protect its own infrastructure,
the RATP plans to pump water and eject it in the streets or
in the stormwater network. The amount of water ejected in
the stormwater network is likely to be very small compared
to the volume of an intense storm, but it is possible that in
doing so, they bring water in areas that are not directly sub-
merged (the location of which is known). The exact impact is
studied by the RATP; it will not question the accessibility of
these areas. Nevertheless, the possible retroaction loop was
worth mentioning.
4 Results and discussion
This ﬁrst experimentation with a network manager stresses
the importance of interdependencies for the functioning of a
system. Though the system we chose was one of good prac-
tice and already knew its dependencies, this analysis is use-
ful for the comprehension of the interactions between sys-
tems. This quite simple tool can be used with other man-
agers that are not as well prepared as the RATP in order to
help them identify those dependencies. The tool is useful for
the manager to prioritize the safety work for supplies, plan
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Fig. 4. Four interdependent systems.
Fig. 5. Metro portrait.
for alternative sources or optimize recovery. Of course, the
graphical representation is just a tool for better communica-
tion; the most important information comes from the discus-
sion with the manager. Here, we highlighted that the criti-
cal dependency of the RATP network on electricity supply is
well taken into account, but also highly uncertain. The ex-
ploitation of temporal information is limited here to auton-
omy (black boxes in Fig. 5), because the inertia or the recov-
ery delays have no relevance here. Indeed, the RATP man-
agers decide to avoid damage by interrupting partially the
service, so that the infrastructure is not endangered. Then,
the return to normal conditions depends on the duration of
ﬂoods and if everything goes right, the metro should be able
to operate almost immediately.
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With only one system, we begin to imagine the mutual
effects that systems can have on one another, justifying the
systemic approach we chose for the city. It is also clear that
collaborative work around those interdependencies is needed
and that more detailed data will also become necessary. In-
deed, beyond this ﬁrst approach, if managers want to en-
force common solutions to tackle these interdependencies,
they need to know where and how they take place so that
technical and organizational measures are efﬁcient.
This research will keep on with the diagnosis of all net-
work managers in Paris: drinkable water, sewage, electricity
supply, telecommunications, but also city services or private
ﬁrms identiﬁed by the previous systems as essential for their
functioning: road network, food suppliers, goods and ser-
vices. Then with all the diagnoses, a collaborative session
will be gathering all the managers in order to share the infor-
mation highlighted.
5 Conclusions
In this way of implementing resilience, we hope that our
method raises awareness to urban services managers, at least.
We aimed at realizing a method that can be accepted and un-
derstood by managers in order to help them identify their
ﬂaws, and assets as well. The case study has shown that this
is a practical analysis tool and that relevant conclusions can
be reached for the network manager. In our future work, we
will improve the method with more case studies. The col-
laborative part will be quite challenging, but a robust work
on collaborative methods used in water management (Ridder
et al., 2005) or land use should ensure the effectiveness of
the workshops. We have focused here on general methods to
meet the reluctance or lack of information from managers;
we remain convinced that a geographical tool to locate and
quantify interdependencies is needed. A common GIS plat-
form gathering all networks, city infrastructures, populations
and issues could be of high value in planning for a more re-
silient city.
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